The recognition of biological differences as an important explanatory and predictive element in political behavior has created the need to integrate various models from a variety of fields into a more cohesive theoretical framework. The ostensibly perplexing coexistence of individual differences in the face of universal human design needs to be reconciled. Here we introduce evolution as a theory of political behavior, which allows for the combination of familial socialization, cultural norms, environmental stimuli, rational action and endogenous or innate influences.
sociological determinants (e.g., familial upbringing, etc.), and rational choice models encompass the economic, utility maximizing, and self-interest themes, neither theory in their current forms allows the potential for locating innate sources of preference. Here, building off previous efforts within the discipline, we propose an evolutionary theory of political behavior, which allows for the combination of familial socialization, cultural norms, environmental stimuli, rational action and endogenous or innate influences.
Traditional explanations for the origins and maintenance of political preferences rest principally on external stimuli as the ultimate cause of human behaviors. In their most reduced form, behavioral models argue that all behavior results from social conditioning (Campbell et al. 1960) . Rational choice models assume preferences are exogenous, fixed and given, and remain agnostic, if not unconcerned, about their source (Bueno de Mesquita 1983) . Constructivist models posit social interaction as the source of identities and interests (Wendt 1999) . Even more robust psychological models such as Prospect Theory lack a theory of framing to explain the sources of predictable differences in individual variation in risk taking behavior (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . All of these models, while useful in their own environmental or cultural domains, tell only a portion of the -human‖ story. None directly incorporate the innate part of the equation regarding human biological development: that is, why humans developed as they have, and how they may be decisively influenced by their biological needs and drives. A more complete theory of human decision making and preference structures incorporates both the endogenous as well as environmental sources of behavior.
In order to justify a model of political preferences which includes biology, we need to understand the ways in which genetics, hormones, cognitive function or physiology may influence the development and manifestation of political attitudes and behavior, either through a process of evolved variation, as a by-product of such an evolved mechanism, or as noise, depending on topic and domain. We all know that individuals espouse diverse political attitudes and behavior, and these differences in political orientation often remain quite stable over the lifecourse despite changing environmental circumstances Jennings and Stoker 1991) . How is it that we can witness stable individual differences in preferences within the context of a species typical universal design in humans? Why should political attitudes and beliefs coalesce along such predictable patterns, such as the left-right spectrum which seems to emerge across cultures and regions? We suggest that this may occur because such clustering might provide an adaptive advantage in solving repeated problems which humans encountered throughout their species development. These preferences may inculcate strategies which help people negotiate the complex social and political problems they confront. We can then interrogate and examine the nature of these mechanisms and how manifest within the modern political context. In so doing, it becomes possible to explore how dimensions of variation in the ancestral world map onto the process of developing stable individual political preferences and ideologies within population groups encompassing a variety of such belief patterns .
In this chapter, we first introduce the theory of evolution and argue that this model offers a potential foundation for a unifying theory of political behavior, and, in concert with the methods and models introduced by biology, genetics, epidemiology, and physiology, among other cognitive and behavioral sciences, a means to empirically test hypotheses that address the combination of sociological, evolutionary and biological influences. In this way, we can examine the ways in which individual differences in political disposition represent a parameterization of universal strategies evolved to respond effectively to the threats and opportunities commensurate with group living. Thus, an evolutionary approach assumes our brains are organized in certain ways, and indeed humans tend to think in particular patterns, but tremendous individual variance remains within those broader patterns. We seek to investigate the nature of this variation within this particular evolutionary context. Through this exploration, we seek to combine the parsimony of evolutionary models for explaining the emergence of human universals with the powerful methods of the cognitive and behavioral sciences which help explain the emergence, purpose and manifestation of individual differences within the context of those universals. We thus explore the nature of individual difference in the context of human universals to create a synthesis of the ways in which universality and variance interact to produce the expression of political attitudes, preferences and behavior we all witness acting throughout the world every day in myriad institutional contexts. To achieve this goal, it remains beneficial to explore the neurocomputational psychological mechanisms which underlie human behavior, in interaction with their specific genetic precursors. Such an approach provides greater purchase toward understanding and uncovering the sources of human political and social motivations when faced with a certain decision or environmental challenges.
Theoretically, this means that many investigations begin with the study of complex adaptive behaviors, which are assumed to have evolved as a function of natural selection. The goal of investigating how mutations can develop into species typical designs then focuses the exploration of how functional adaptations can evolve into specific psychological mechanisms. Variations in response to particular environmental or ecological inputs provide the basis for such an adapatationist approach to the emergence of individual differences. A good analogy for individual variance within the context of universal species typicality is provided by cars. All cars share a similar function, namely that of taking the driver and passengers from one point to another. That said, the ride provided by a Ferrari bears almost no relation whatsoever to the experience of driving, say, a Ford Pinto. In this way, the function of transportation remains universal; the individual variance of the experience varies enormously. Similarly, evolution continues to operate while on all living things all the time, much like trying to fix your car while it is still running, posing similar biological challenges to survival.
This discussion begins with a brief overview of the central puzzle of understanding choice and preference formation in a political context, concentrating on the inadequacy of models which presume rationality for adequately explaining political outcomes of interest. The next section proceeds to document the escalation of biological work in political science over the last half decade, justifying the current need for a cohesive theoretical synthesis and integration based on evolutionary theory. The bulk of the argument focuses on the tenets of evolutionary theory, marking the important ways in which modern variants differ in profound ways from earlier formulations. This part outlines some of the main themes in the current empirical literature working within this paradigm. The final section demonstrates how evolutionary models, in combination with methods drawn from other sciences, can tie these disparate research agendas together into a synthetic theory which can not only incorporate the models and lessons learned from environmental approaches, but can also provide a serious foundation for future empirical work in preference formation and other crucial aspects of human political and social attitudes and behavior.
The Puzzle of Choice and Preference Formation
A growing body of scholarship both within and outside of political science has convincingly shown that not all behavior can be attributed to rational cognition in reaction to environmental stimuli, and that all preferences do not result solely from familial upbringing or socialization (for a review see Hatemi 2007) . Traditional theories of political behavior would benefit from modification in order to more fully incorporate contemporary findings. For example, consider typical models of vote choice.
Researchers gather several important social indicators, such as sex, race, age, income, religion, education, ideology and so forth, observe individual level voters using a large sample, employ one of the many accepted statistical techniques, examine the significance and coefficients, and make generalizations.
These models provide insight into why people at large vote for the candidates they choose. Yet taking a look at the majority of the literature, the R-squares are often fairly low. Thus, while significant predictors are identified, in many cases the models are not predicting very much (Matsusaka and Palda 1999). 11 Specifically, traditional models do not provide explanations as to why, when faced with different stimuli, individuals make the same choices, or, when faced with similar stimuli, individuals often choose radically different paths of action, outside the tautological recourse to -preference‖ being invoked. If a significant portion of individual variation in behavior is explained by non environmental influences then our current models are limited in their ability to accurately predict political behavior. The only way this would be false is if we believe all humans are the same. Such a position is often taken, though even a passing examination of any given individual bears false witness to such a claim. . While all people may share certain similarities, each person remains indelibly unique as well.
11 Utilizing more than three dozen variables in multiple models of survey data for four national election years Matsusaka and Palda (1999) find that demographic and contextual variables provide significant effects on the probability of voting, but the models do not predict who votes more accurately than random guessing.
Using traditional theories and models, the most critical cause of behavior is left unanswered: that is, where do those preferences come from? It is a question political behavior scholars have not been able to fully answer by invoking only environmental factors. For instance, even though males and females are biologically different, the majority of the social science literature accounts for sex differences as socialized gender differences (Gilligan 1982; Chodorow 1978; Chodorow 1995) . In political science, the biological difference is rarely considered (for an exception see Hatemi, Medland and Eaves 2009; Thayer 2000) . Indeed, political behavior research considers gender the same as sex!. While it may be possible to socially influence one's sexual identity or gender roles, it is certainly impossible to socialize ovaries and child bearing onto a male, or sperm production onto a female. Using biology and the human organism as a potential starting point for universal human similarities as well as individual differences, a biological model can offer an answer for why sex provides variation in addition to -gendered‖ socialization, and why we find further variation in a given subgroup when all other environmental considerations remain constant.
Taking this argument further, environmental models also do not clearly distinguish between different sources of environmental variation. For instance, numerous studies attempt to determine if voting is primarily based upon familial influence as suggested by Campbell et al. (1960) , or more uniquely driven by individual rational action (Downs 1957) . Variables are labeled as -familial‖ (e.g., religion) or -personal‖ (e.g., occupation), but this is an almost arbitrary categorization. Without considering a third biological layer and controlling for familial heredity and in utero influences, it is not possible to parse out the different sources of variation for each variable and examine their effects on the dependent variables of interest (e.g., Eaves et al. 2008) .
At the center of this discussion is the longstanding philosophical question regarding the nature of basic human preferences and motivations. Countless theories of human wants and desires have been offered over the centuries: Aristotle's -virtue‖, Rousseau's -social contract‖, Hobbes's Leviathan, or Maslow's -hierarchy of needs‖, to name a few. However, these preference structures continue to provide an almost arbitrary account of human nature. They lack a unifying theory for why these various needs and desires exist, or how they might be connected to one another. Human preference structures can be more profitably approached from a biological and evolutionary perspective which incorporates our past development and immediate ancestry as precursors to explaining our current political preferences.
Limitations in Extant Models of Political Behavior
Explicating the significant limitations of the existing dominant model for understanding politics provides a useful starting point for justifying the presentation of our suggested, and more comprehensive, alternative theory advocating an evolutionary approach to political choice and action. Rational choice has replaced behaviorism as the dominant theory for political behaviors; rational choice shares with behaviorism the same limitation in its dependence on environmental determinants as the primary if not exclusive cause of political preferences and behaviors.
Yet, while influential within political science, rational choice as an explanatory framework for all human behavior is widely considered implausible outside of the discipline, and its empirical foundations have increasingly been questioned (Green & Shapiro, 1996; Robson and Kaplan 2003) . Numerous challenges from economics, psychology, neuroscience and other fields have found that rational choice models hold limited explanatory capacity by remaining almost exclusively focused on choices motivated by unrealistically narrow conceptions of self-interest (Dawes and Thaler 1988; Tversky and Thaler 1990; Fehr and Gachter 2000; Gintis 2000; Henrich et al. 2001; Fehr and Fishbacher 2004) . Moreover, rational choice appears primarily interested in choices as -revealed preferences‖ or end results. For example, Dawes and Thaler (1988) find that not everyone free rides when they can, thus not all actors are purely rational. Similarly, not all players choose the economically dominant strategy in ultimatum game play (Fehr & Gachter, 2002) . Numerous anomalies persist in payoff games; people behave in ways other than rational choice would predict in the form of both endowment effects and preference reversals. Moreover, Tversky and Thaler (1990) find that people do not have fixed or pre-defined preferences about every situation. Instead preferences are modified and developed during the process of making a decision, suggesting a creative rather than revelatory decision making dynamic. In reality, from a functional perspective, in many cases it would be maladaptive to have fixed preferences. In addition, rational choice models cannot account for certain behaviors, such as acts of pure altruism or suicide, and ultimately it can lead to a tautological method in its -thin‖ form, since any action, even an irrational one, can be explained by hidden -preferences‖ (Landemore 2004) . In fact, preferences often remain absent, relative, volatile and based upon non observable internal processes. Most importantly, rational choice ties all outcomes to preferences, but offers no explication for the preceding logical step; -where do preferences come from?‖ One potential place to look for explanations of the origins of preferences resides in animal ethology. Brosnan and de Waal (2004) provide a very simple example of the fallibility of absolute gains and rationality in an experiment where they taught monkeys to receive tokens as a reward, and then barter them for food. The monkeys learned to be content to swap tokens for cucumber, but if the researchers gave one of the monkeys a grape, a better tasting food, the other monkeys would act irrationally and refuse to hand over their tokens for cucumber; in some instances, they would exchange their tokens for cucumber, but refuse to eat it. The monkeys clearly paid attention to what other monkeys were doing and acted differently when other monkeys received a better reward; thus relative gains proved more important to monkeys than absolute gains. In another demonstration of seemingly irrational decision making, Chen et al. (2006) showed that capuchin monkeys displayed different levels of reference dependence and loss aversion when confronted with risky gambles. Both studies illustrate not only a primate basis for seemingly irrational economic and social behavior, but also point to individual differences in the behavior of non human animals as well.
In one of the most intriguing experiments, Glimcher and Rustichini (2004) isolated a single neuron to determine its relevance in decision making. They trained a monkey to recognize that by looking a certain direction when prompted to make a decision, the monkey would receive a well liked juice reward 40 percent of the time, but by looking the opposite direction the monkey would receive the juice 60 percent of the time. Examining the brain activity during this decision process revealed that during the learning period significant brain activity was present, but after the learning period, the monkey exhibited no activity in any part of the brain outside of the single neuron in the eye when faced with the decision task.
In other words, after the training period, the monkey's optical neuron appeared to encode a defined expected utility and, in turn, the monkey reacted in anticipation of a preferred outcome without ever accessing the brain! While most evidence finds that primates, including humans, often do not always act in a utility maximizing way, especially because emotional constraints prohibit or supersede decision making capability, Glimcher and Rustichini's (2004) experiment provides evidence that in certain situations, a single neuron can act rationally (unbeknownst to the individual), even if the brain and the larger conscious person does not. That is, even when the rules of the game changed (new information), the monkey had already been cued to stay on course in its pre-preprogrammed decision. What possible purpose could this serve? From an energy saving biological perspective, once a task is learned, ignoring new information could be adaptive because it saves energy. Based on these findings, it could be hypothesized that this conservation of cognitive energy may constitute part of the reason why many people have a difficult time changing their opinions once formed. Staying the course may simply be an energy saving tactic, so new information need not be processed unless severe pressures requires relearning. So while rationality exists, and behavior can be trained or socialized, it is not the rational choice or socialization conceptions of behavior that scholars in political science promote, nor is it the kind of choice humans may always be aware of; rather, rationality may emerge prior and subsequent to environmental stimuli. Rather, rationality exists at a biological, not merely cognitive, level.
Outside of political science, rational choice is even questioned on the grounds that rational action is self serving. Gintis (2000) Additional evidence that people do not act solely on the basis of rational cognition as defined by political scientists is provided by experiments utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology. McCabe et al. (2001) viewed the brain activity of subjects who played an ultimatum game against humans versus those who played against computers. When viewing the fMRI results, subjects playing against a computer only showed brain activity in the parietal cortex, the computational part of the brain, but when subjects played against humans the entire brain remained active, including the emotional regions. The subjects used emotion, not just rational calculation, when playing against other people; this is important because the political world in which we live is a profoundly social one. Similar experiments by Sanfey et al. (2003) found that negative responses in the ultimatum game were related to activity in the anterior insula (emotional center processing disgust in particular), while the dorso lateral prefrontal cortex activity (cognitive center) remained quiescent; when the emotion center was highly active, the subjects' responses significantly differed from those who exhibited just prefrontal cortex activity. In essence, rational behavior can be limited by physiological and emotional constraints. This behavior clearly makes sense from a functionalist perspective, which emphasizes the way people must navigate their social world successfully in order to survive and reproduce. Although humans can make cognitive choices and maximize benefit, we also employ physiology and emotion in our decision making dynamics.
Experiments with humans show that people become less cooperative if treated unfairly, and punish uncooperative people even if their own reward declines as a result. They even tend to punish others when they have no investment in the person being treated unfairly, or when they have no expectation that they will recover the cost of punishing. This remains true even when the -altruistic punisher‖ does not get to observe the punishment being handed out (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Gintis 2000; Henrich et al. 2001; Fehr and Fishbacher 2004; Alford and Hibbing 2006a) . The similarity in non rational action in both humans and monkeys points to some internal primate process that may help shape motivation and preference.
Even -thin‖ rational choice would be hard pressed to advocate that being angry was preferable to eating, or that people prefer to have less rather than more, thus explaining why the monkeys refused to eat cucumber, or why people altruistically punish. In the face of empirical evidence that a great deal of behavior is not explained by self-interested utility maximization, supporters of rational choice models dismiss these concerns, claiming these observations as -anomalies,‖ and protest that rational choice is the most scientific theory for social science (Riker 1990 ). Yet those outside of political science strongly disagree, and find that rationality as defined by Riker and others often has much less to do with determining behavior than other factors, including biological ones (Fisher 1918; Eaves et al. 1989 ).
Rather, those in both the social and life sciences find that humans are often not rational, cannot control their rationality, nor have the knowledge to do so (Bruel 1970; Dawkins 1976; Alexander 1987; Bjorklund et al. 2001; Gintis et al. 2003; Kendler et al. 2005) . Over the last several decades, there has been a steady movement away from rational choice by the discipline (economics) that introduced it (Hogarth and Reder 1987) . Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman began the movement in earnest with their 1974 Science article. By 1997, the Quarterly Journal of Economics devoted a special issue to behavioral economics and several years later the Nobel Prize was awarded for behavioral economic research which focused on how people do not make rational choices.
Biological work in past decade
If environmental theories such as rational choice and behaviorism are incomplete, and biology provides additional insight into human behavior, then it is necessary to clarify how evolution and biology mesh with the study of political behavior. The use of evolutionary models to explain political behavior is relatively new, and not until the 1960's was it introduced with some consistency (Campbell, 1975; Somit 1976) . Although the number of scholars adding to the literature continues to rise, evolutionary politics and the biology of political preferences remain a relatively small part of political science scholarship Fowler & Dawes, 2009; Hatemi et al., 2008 ). However, while the field is relatively small, the amount of research undertaken and the importance of the findings have grown in considerable magnitude over the last five years (see Fowler and Schreiber 2008; Oxley et al., 2008) . Recent studies have shown that political behaviors are in part heritable and subject to evolutionary designs (Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2005; Fowler Baker and Dawes 2008; Hatemi et al 2007) . Opinions regarding abortion on demand, immigration, death penalty, euthanasia, conservatism, and authoritarianism as well as behaviors such as being a leader, religiosity, educational attainment, voter participation, and political intensity have been found to be genetically influenced, while religious affiliation and political partisanship appear primarily environmental (Martin et al. 1986; Eaves et al. 1989; Crelia and Tesser 1996; Eaves et al. 1999; Olson et al. 2001; Hatemi et al 2009a; Hatemi et al 2009b) . The findings that shared genes can explain up to 50 percent of the variance in political attitudes was a stunning revelation to the discipline (see Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2005 ; for an earlier version see Eaves et al 1999) . Environment is not everything.
Adding a biological component to the study of political preferences and accepting that voter preferences are not simply a function of one's issue positions, party affiliation, or level of information, but rather reflects elements influenced by one's genetic makeup has inspired a movement to redress the examination of political behavior as a whole. Introducing a more nuanced model which includes both environmental and biological factors may help further explain why some people vote, others stay home, why some people choose different issue positions in the face of similar environmental or social stimuli, and why others choose the same position in the face of divergent environmental triggers. One such example is a recent exploration of voting preference; Hatemi et al (2007) found that which party one votes for is genetically influenced, but only indirectly through attitudes about social welfare.
Research in the area of psychiatric behavior genetics has developed a series of advanced epidemiological methods we advocate and apply for exploring political behaviors. They ask questions such as: why do some people raised in the same environment, faced with a competitor, choose violence, while others choose cooperation? Could it be that some people simply have an inherently higher or lower threshold for using violence than others? Could this tendency be related to other aspects of individual variance, such as personal physical strength in organized, systems of covariation (Sell et al., 2009 )? Do mechanisms in our brain and internal chemical reactions mitigate, mediate or moderate our reactions to external stimuli in systematic, yet contingent, ways? Looking beyond the political science scholarship, the answer is a profound ‖yes‖ (e.g., Caspi et al. 2002; Caspi et al. 2003; Coolidge et al. 2004; Meyer et al. 2004; Lesch 2005 Indeed, disciplines that examine nonhuman behavior, whether primatologists, zoologists, or others, examine the subject's physiological nature as it interacts with their environment. The animal literature is 12 Another example of the interaction between genotype and environmental factors can be found in the form of traumatic early life events. Such events emerge as a key precursor to sparking the manifestation of adult predilections toward physical violence. Frazzetto et al (2007) demonstrated that, significantly, the timing of such assaults matter as well in predisposing affected youth to physical aggression in later life; trauma during puberty portended much more poorly than negative events experienced at other times. Similar experiments examining depression, suicide and alcoholism provide converging evidence (Meyer et al. 2004; Kendler et al. 2005; Lesch et al. 2005 ). For human behavior, genes not only matter, but in certain cases and under certain social conditions, they exert a profound difference.
an excellent example. When researching the political aspects of the group, primatologists note the physiological makeup, such as the physical size and strength, of individual chimps. In this way, the physical organism is as important in explaining behavior as the environmental conditions (Waal 2002; Strier 2003) . However, those who study human political behavior rarely include the human physiological condition in their explanations (for an exception see Madsen 1985; Rosen, 2005) , and instead rely almost exclusively on environmental factors for assessing causality. An alternative, more comprehensive approach to the explication of human political behavior does not eschew environmental factors in favor of biological ones. Rather, it integrates and synthesizes environmental conditions along with endogenous influences to achieve a more cohesive view of human political decision making and behavior (citation withheld).
A complete theory of political science would thus necessitate integrating traditional environmental theories, drawn from rational choice and behaviorism, with a biological theory to test hypotheses about population universals and individual biological variability. Building a foundation for political behavior on the twin parapets of evolutionary theory and biological methodologies which specify sources of variation (both individual and population based) allows a complete model of human decision making behavior to be constructed and empirically supported.
Evolution
Evolution serves as the foundation of biology and represents a broad theory for individual, societal, institutional and natural development and existence. Evolutionary theory is widely espoused by nearly all branches of science as the theoretical underpinning of scholarly work, whether in geology, climatology, primatology, or oncology (Economist 1997; Werner 1999; Alexander 2004; Wilson 2005; Ramaswany et al. 2006) . The evidence that evolution exists, and is, widespread across species is overwhelming. The models are, increasing in breadth and depth, and are increasingly interconnected across almost all disciplines of study, including economics, the discipline that once championed rational choice (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Economist 1997; Quammen 2004; Robson and Kaplan 2003; Wilson 1987 ). The main tenets are not restricted to biologists; rather, evolution as a theory can be invoked by any discipline with minimal investment (Wilson 2002) .
For purposes relevant to political scientists, the main concepts of evolution refer to natural selection as the means driving evolution; thus, traits are passed down from our ancestors. The existence of natural selection no longer prompts great debate; it is an assumed reality among those in the scientific, medical and professional fields and is accepted as mainstream thought in the public, mass media, popculture, and academic circles (Aach et al. 2001; Buss 1995; Futuyma 1985; Futuyma 1986; Lander et al. 2001) .
13 Yet examining the impact natural selection has on political traits and how political preferences may be transmitted genetically remains relatively novel. The important insight for political behavior is the recognition that traits are passed down from our ancestors. The amount or significance of genetic transmission can be empirically tested on a trait level basis, and can account for individual variation in political outcomes of interest. Such work can, in turn, undergird the development of an empirically accurate model encompassing elements of universal political preference formation while also fully recognizing the ways in which individuals remarkably differ.
Charles Darwin (1859) proposed that individuals who differ from others in their species in ways which increase their relative number of offspring will inevitably leave a greater number of descendants in the following generations with those same (heritable) traits. The concept is that small, random, heritable differences among individuals result in different chances for survival and reproductive success. The development of such heritable differences led to a process of gradual species change that is -evolution by natural selection.‖ Natural selection is ultimately a matter of reproductive success and species survival, but it is a severe misconception to suggest that natural selection favors the -fittest‖ in the common sense of the word, or that evolution by natural selection implies progress to a superior form of life (Badcock 1991) . 13 The evidence to support natural selection and evolution in general is vast (see Nature, February 15, 2001 for results from the Human Genome Project). Also see Gunter and Dhand (2002) editor's note on the mouse genome effort, where they find that 99% of house mice genes have direct counterparts in humans. For natural selection examples, see Rice and Chippendale's (2001) lab experiments involving scores of generations of the fruit fly; also see Lenski et al's (2003) experiment involving 20,000 generations of the bacterium Escherichia coli.
Generally, natural selection only asserts that heritable tendencies leading to greater reproductive success are enough to explain evolution. However, evolutionary theory is not solely about reproduction in the narrow as opposed to the broader sense. Any behavior could offer a potential means for reproductive advantage depending on how successful it becomes in the current and specific environment.
Stronger preferences for warfare or cooperation, although likely to appear opposite, could be used in different circumstances within the same individual or community to pursue the goal of survival or mating and therefore be considered adaptive from this perspective (Badcock 1991; Gat 2000; Quammen 2004 ).
Consider how successful a balance between outgroup warfare and ingroup cooperation might be in promoting survival against neighbors in an environment defined by scarce resources. If those environments existed long enough, then over generations there would be a gradual shift in the populations toward the more advantageous traits. In its simplest sense, organisms that possess heritable traits for reproductive success will inevitably indirectly ensure that they and their offspring are more plentiful than others who do not possess those heritable traits for reproductive success in a given environment. Thus, over time, the number of organisms in that species who possess the particular advantageous reproductive traits will increase. And over generations, the relative percentage of organisms without the advantageous reproductive traits will decline in a commensurate fashion.
In most species, natural selection will eventually -phase‖ out genotypes that minimize reproductive success. However, highly successful organisms such as humans are not necessarily forced to confront this scenario. Humans represent the most adaptable and successful sentient organism on the planet, and have been able to alter their environment on a global scale (birth control, medical advancements, global warming, migration, etc). As such, humans appear to have the greatest within species genetic variation and thus are not as readily subject to the phasing out of genotypes; a variety of different genotypes on some traits may prove successful within particular ecological contexts. It is more likely that genes which led to higher reproductive success will be more prevalent, but not completely overtake other genotypes, thus increasing genetic variability. Moreover, a variety of tendencies on some traits, such as cooperation for example, may produce stable equilibriums over time (Orbell, 2004) . Of further interest is how human culture has shaped genetic transmission; adhering to modern social norms, humans have been able to alter their evolutionary design by ensuring those with suboptimal survival traits survive in greater numbers, again furthering genetic variation (e.g., vaccinations, etc).
An important and common misperception is that Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection inevitably and principally predicts contemporary -survival of the fittest‖. In fact, this term was coined by Herbert Spencer, prior to Darwin's Origin of Natural Species. Darwin adopted the phrase from
Spencer to summarize the process of natural selection, but not to define it. The individual organism is not adapting nor is it the -fittest‖. Rather, the species as a whole is changing over generations.
Not all heritable traits involve survival, fitness or reproductive traits; rather, genes are linked in countless ways and individuals can inherit genetic sources for numerous preferences, behaviors, and physical conditions that do not represent optimal survival traits in the current environment, or relate to modern reproduction or fitness (offspring). It is quite likely that only certain markers remain relevant for survival or fitness, while a large number of other genotypes are also passed down, thus providing endless variations in behavioral and physiological traits. Of further importance is that humans migrate. The intermingling of peoples from vastly different regions, which led to different traits supporting optimal adaption for those different environments, has given rise to even greater variation. Evolution is not focused on individual survival, but species success. Differential reproductive success linked to differences in heritable traits for a specific environment, not differential individual survival success, is the core of natural selection. Survival is important to the extent that it is required for reproduction, but individual survival does not represent the primary drive for natural selection (Buss 1988) . No individual is immortal, but any given gene remains potentially immortal depending on its advantage in aiding its transporter to reproduce.
Evolutionary theorists assert preferences have inherent elements; as such, we would thus expect political behavior to be influenced by heritable genetic traits which are the product of our species' evolutionary past (Watts 1983). As our evolutionary past has made us highly adaptable, humans are able to integrate or overlay the social context of the day from the past. Indeed, human's adaptability is itself one of our most critically important evolved traits. Thus, behavior results from a function of genes passed down through generations in interaction with the current environment. Unquestionably, evolutionary theorists acknowledge the importance of environmental cues because human adaptations occur precisely in reactions to particular environmental contingencies. Thus, in the face of similar genetic traits, humans often manifest different preferences and behaviors, especially if they experience divergent eliciting triggers for behavior. This explains one of the ways in which individual variance can occur in the context of human universals, along with genetic noise, variation or mutation.
Evolution considers both the past and present environments as important mediators of genetic expression. In other words, evolutionary theories of behavior grant more consideration to the impact of the environmental than popularly understood. The environment affects humans' internal sources of preferences, as well as the external expression of those preferences. Primarily environmental models such as rational choice or behaviorism only tend to include current environmental influences, and neglect past environmental influences outside general purpose learning, and either discount all inherent properties, or assume them as given without any explanation for variation across individuals.
However, evolutionary theories suggest that social science research designs are necessary to explain the impact of the current environment on behavior. Neither the genetic component nor the environmental component alone can account for more than a portion of behavioral variability (Corning 1971; Eaves et al. 1989 ). Only within particular environments can certain preferences be expressed. As such, although rational choice in its current form(s) appears to be unable to reconcile the use of evolution, physiology and heritability as sources of attitudes and preferences, evolution does not reject rational choice, behaviorist, or other frameworks used to explain environmental influences. Evolution is intrinsically rational, dependent on the environment, but biologically rational in nature. This is vital to understanding the importance of heritability; proponents of evolutionary theories do not advocate the dismissal of rational choice or behaviorism. Rather, evolutionary models posit that the current environment represents only part of the equation instead of the whole story.
By utilizing the theory of evolution, and incorporating inherited traits to examine political attitudes, political scientists can incorporate a theory and methodology that has motivated and continues to produce some of the most important scientific findings. Employing evolutionary models can also help to bridge the gap between the social and hard sciences (Wilson 1987; Economist 1997; Kurzban and Leary 2001; Ridley 2003; Quammen 2004 ). Central to this integration remains the intrinsic intertwine between endogenous and environmental factors in generating political attitudes and behaviors of interest.
Consider the following thought experiment. Humans are by nature driven to do certain things: we must eat, drink, and sleep. As a species, we strive to learn, procreate, communicate, have relationships, cooperate and so on (Wilson 1980) . We are social beings, and are meant to interact with one another.
We do not do these things because our current environment forces us to do so. (Lopreato and Crippen 1999; Alford and Hibbing 2004) . Simply put, our current theories and examinations largely assume that all people are biologically the same when it comes to politics, which is a radical notion considering how remarkably diverse humans are in virtually every other domain.
Exorcising Social Darwinism
It has been suggested that it is immoral and unscientific to connect biology and human behavior Ledger et al. 2001) . Sadly, humanity does have a history of misusing Darwin's name and misrepresenting evolution to suit personal biases, whether inspired by race, gender or social class (Hudson 2001) . However, modern scientific models of evolution are not synonymous with the Spencerian social Darwinism that ostensibly justified the sterilization of minorities and the poor, or the horrific eugenics movements that attempted to reify the inferior status of any who were not wealthy white Christian heterosexual males (Landman 1932; Selden 2000) . Nor does evolutionary theory merely offer an exercise to explain why some people are superior to others or have a better lot in contemporary society.
Spencer developed social Darwinism by applying evolution to capitalism, social class, and human society. Unlike the Weberian protestant view, where effort and morality remain inextricably linked to outcomes, for Spencer the decisive factor was a matter of genes. Those who flourished in modern society must have had the -fittest‖ genes, whereas the poor, uneducated and lower classes were judged to have unfit genes, and failure in life was their inevitable fate (Moore 1903; Hofstadter 1955) . But Darwin's evolution by natural selection (including modern interpretations of Darwin) lies far from those misrepresentations.
The process of natural selection is based upon adaptive traits beginning at a much earlier period in human development, where pure economic power seeking and self interest were not the only potential adaptive traits, if such abilities were adaptive at all. Certainly many important human social and political traits, including kin detection, mate selection, foraging for food, avoiding predators and cheater detection evolved in a context prior to modern market conditions. In fact, we must take into account the central role of cooperation and trust in human evolution. Collaboration is an adaptive trait, particularly for related individuals. Numerous studies show that it takes enormous incentives to motivate one to -sell out‖ in-group and family members, particularly those with whom a person shares a significant amount of genes (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Kruger 2003) . Trust can prove adaptive in many situations, and though strongest for family members, also allows for cooperation with those to whom we are not related. Yet people must be careful in their judgment concerning who to trust, and keep careful track of those who violate trust in order to maximize opportunities for successful cooperation over time with those who share similar values and goals. With the exception of vampire bats, the ability to track others behaviors and know who and when to trust, and when to punish, is unique to humans and certain primates (Wilkinson 1984) . The human capacity to -identify a large number of individuals and to keep score of its relations with them, detecting the dishonest or greedy and taking vengeance, even at some cost to itself‖ is an evolved one .
Experimental evidence has shown humans' perceived good will and cooperative attitudes offer superior survivability and represent traits which are passed on (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003) , which is why humans are more cooperative than other species. As noted earlier, Gintis et al (2003) finds humans maintain a predisposition to cooperate with others and punish those who violate the norm of cooperation, even at a personal cost or when there is no expectation that they will recover the cost of punishing.
Certainly, the evolution of our species directly results from our success as a collective, but our universal or individual genetic adaptive traits may likely have little bearing on modern day individual success within our society. We cannot confuse our species' success with individual success, nor can we confuse our species' source of evolved attitudes with individual ones. This leads to the central difference between Darwin's and Spencer's view. In order to accept evolution as an explanatory theory for human political behaviors and attitudes, we must identify cross-cultural universals and look for individual variations within or deviations from those universals (Buss 1989; Buss 1994; Dearden 1974) .
Evolutionary Theories focused on Human Social Behavior
The use of evolution as an explanatory theory for human social behavior has been gaining steady momentum since the 1970's with increased attention beginning in the 1990's. It takes different forms depending on its origin in psychology, sociology, biology or ecology, but each variant uses a common foundation based upon evolution and natural selection (Buss 1995; Cosmides and Tooby 1997; Barber 2005) . In analyzing social and psychological behaviors, Evolutionary Psychology has represented the most common theoretical variant.
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) asserts preferences are not simply inherent, but inherent because of our ancestors' ability to solve repeated adaptive problems which impacted our survival as a species.
Therefore, our cognitive architectures results from an interaction of our genetic structure with our environment over generations. These propensities are then passed on to our offspring, who utilize these inherent abilities in their day to day actions in an almost unconscious way. Our simple tasks (e.g., optical transmission) only seem simple because our proficiency in solving them is genetically transmitted and largely goes unnoticed. The most useful of these effortless abilities typically evolve into a convergent universal, species typical functional design.
Evolutionary Psychology theorists posit that 99% of our history as humans developed in huntergatherer (HG) societies and this period helped shape the human decision making cognitive architecture with which we live today (Cosmides and Tooby 1997; Gat 2000) . Thus our ability to mitigate the problems of today are only adaptations of skills evolved from the past HG way of life that shaped human behavior over approximately 2 million years of development Barkow et al. 1992; Buss 1995; Buss 1999) . Evolutionary Psychology utilizes the hunter-gatherer hypotheses to generate predictions about human behaviors by specifying physiological and psychological systems that might have developed to solve earlier repeated adaptive problem which impacted reproductive fitness. EP starts with the adaptive problem to be solved and then infers the particular functional physiological or psychological requirements that would be needed to solve it, generating experimental tests for the existence of such mechanisms in the modern mind along the way. As EP utilizes these standards for examining evolutionary hypothesis regarding personality, social scientists can also use these ideas to do the same for political behaviors. Such a model would potentially provide insight into human political preferences as derived or mediated by our evolutionary adaptive traits.
The earliest proponents of evolutionary behavior theories claim every personality phenomenon is analyzable as either: (1) an adaptation; (2) a by-product of an adaptation; (3) noise in the system, or (4) some combination thereof (Symons 1979; Tooby and Cosmides 1994) . Therefore, EP tends to largely focus on identifying cross-cultural universals of human behavior, not individual differences or sub-group differences. However, EP recognizes that -[b]oth the psychological universals that constitute human nature and the genetic differences that contribute to individual variation are the product of the evolutionary process‖ (Tooby and Cosmides (1990: 19) . Indeed, universal human characteristics may have different expressions in different societies dependent upon culture and other differences in environmental cues.
Experiments with flies as well as population differences between people in Africa versus North
America show the evolution of such variance clearly. Patterns of genetic variation in HG groups such as the !Kung and African Pygmies exhibit low genetic diversity within the population coupled with higher frequencies of DNA types not found in surrounding population groups, thus suggesting long-term isolation, small population sizes, and strong heritable and evolved development. Humans did not all evolve the same, just mostly the same.
It is important to clarify that although many evolved traits still work in the best interest of human survival and reproduction today, not all evolved traits maintain their usefulness over time. For example, the human preference for high sugar, high fat, and high calorie foods was definitely adaptive in prehistoric life, since such preferences helped protect survival in times of famine, and access to this type of food was not commonplace as it is today. Yet in modern human societies, large intake of high fat and high sugar foods are largely maladaptive, leading to health problems such as obesity, high blood pressure, high cholesterol and diabetes (Bjorklund and Pellegrini 2001; Johansen and Edgar 1996; Kaplan et al. 2000; Tattersall 1998 ).
Difficulties Incorporating EP
Evolutionary Psychology has developed considerably since its inception, but has also faced significant empirical and theoretical challenges, manifesting, among other ways, in a series of debates in the literature addressing EP's shortcomings and modifications (e.g., Kurzban and Haselton 2005; Rose and Rose 2000) . One variant of Evolutionary Psychology (EP), Popular EP is often criticized for its lack of empirical validity (e.g., Buller 2005), though many claims made by opponents have also been rebutted (Machery and Barrett 2006) .
From the perspective of political behavior, the most critical problem revolves around temporal concerns. If the majority of human existence took place in the hunter gatherer (Pleistocene) period, then we must look for the source of modern universal human preference structures from this early period.
Although we may not know for certain how Hunter Gatherers lived, archeological, anthropological, and contemporary observations of modern day hunter-gatherer societies serve as models of human communities prior to the development of agricultural societies, and thus provide populations for examination in the areas of interest (Oota et al. 2005) . The Pleistocene period was stable for a very, very long time, whereas our current environment changes rapidly. Thus, following the logic of EP, there is too much time needed to observe real-time empirical evidence of human evolution in progress; and in the EP view, the enduring legacy of past psychological infrastructure does not change easily or quickly even in the face of a rapidly changing external environment. In this way, watching evolution in action is like trying to fix a car while it is running.
Using anthropology and evolutionary literature, it might be possible to construct a theme of basic attitudes and behaviors that would represent putatively adaptive traits for the social environments in which they putatively evolved. However, any attempt to examine if evolutionary selection pressures have a relationship to political attitudes would require a sample of humans in the hunter gather mold, and some hypotheses suggesting behaviors which hunter-gather (HG) humans would have needed to negotiate their social and political world successfully while also exerting an impact on their reproductive fitness.
However, findings in the evolutionary literature with regard to selection pressures are often imprecise, as is the knowledge of the environments that HG societies typically faced. While the theory of natural selection remains relatively straightforward, linking current behaviors and attitudes to past selection pressures is not. Some behaviors may not exert any reproductive advantage and thus would not be expected to be heritable; others may exist as by-products of designs which evolved for other purposes (i.e, mate selection). Other preferences may represent genetic noise or mutation. Separating out these effects as they manifest in the modern world poses complex theoretical and empirical challenges. Clearly our society today is much more complex than that faced by our earlier hunter-gatherer ancestors and therefore it is not always readily apparent how we can empirically answer how it is that yesterday's brain is solving today's problems. Thus linking every possible contemporary individual attitude and behavior to a past selection pressure is not plausible and would be highly speculative best.
Regardless, even if we could perform tests of such hypotheses, these types of examinations would likely add very little explanatory capacity to addressing such specific questions as why someone votes the way they do. In effect, if the designs prove universal, as is often the focus of EP, they may provide little additional edifice upon which to build a model to explain individual variance in political preference. In other words, while the most recent version of the theory promotes the importance of individual and cultural variation, the empirical focus has concentrated on uncovering human universals, not on explicating individual variations-which is what political scientists typically emphasize. Thus, EP has been often criticized as simply a nice foundation upon which to generate hypotheses, or at worst, a better -just so‖ story. This does not mean that explorations of EP remain without merit, but rather that their focus on human universals provides formidable roadblocks in seeking to explain stable individual political differences.
In addition the vast majority of EP limited evolutionary pressures and changes to the Pleistocene or to a very long period of development (tens of thousands of years), and often does not consider more modern cases of human evolution. Studies of organisms in laboratory settings provide strong evidence that certain representations of EP miscategorized the potentially rapid pace of evolutionary change. There is considerable evidence that in modern life evolution is taking place at a much quicker pace in the face of environmental change than typically posited by the greater EP literature (e.g., Lenski et al 2003; Rice and Chippendale 2001) .
These concerns presented a considerable problem for political scientists seeking to use EP, as it appeared to assume that stability in the environment slowed down evolution, or at least assumed evolutionary change always proceeded at a slow pace. Indeed, this is the opposite of what evolution is, what evolution does, and how evolution operates. Species evolve as their environment evolves; as modern day human environments evolve rapidly, so should the humans who interact with them similarly experience relatively more rapid changes and shifts. While it is true that the Pleistocene was stable for tens of thousands of years, there is little evidence that evolution only takes place in spans just as long.
Rather, as noted above, evidence to the contrary exists.
So how does political science utilize evolution and biology to empirically examine human political behavior? How can we test the evolution of political behaviors and the biological sources of political preferences? Modern revisions and extensions of EP, driven by new experimental and biological methods, have emerged (e.g., Burns 2004; Keller 2008; New, Cosmides and Tooby 2007; Zietsch et al. 2008 ). These approaches are geared toward addressing the other half of the heuristic not initially addressed by Tooby and Cosmides (1990) , that is, they focus on individual differences. If evolution is to provide a universal theory for political behavior, the ability to explain the similarities humans share through population studies must be followed by attempts to explain sub-group and individual variations within and among these universal themes (Flinn and Low 1986) . Specifically, it is variation within these universal themes, often likely to influence reproductive fitness, that we should find a genetic relationship to political behaviors. Modern biological methods and statistical techniques allow for empirical testing of individual variation within the universal themes of human behavior. By adding genotypic, hormonal, and neurological analyses, it becomes possible to make individual level inferences concerning political behaviors. The relation between the environment, culture and individual variability is mediated by one's underlying genetic makeup, which at a population level has been formed by past selection forces, but at an individual level by that person's direct ancestors and environment, which vary to a great degree within a given population (e.g., Wilson 1975) .
Moving from Human Universals to Individual Differences
Population universals only tell part of the story. As noted earlier, humans are remarkably individually diverse. Our genetic code varies to a greater degree than any other species (See Nature, February 15, 2001 for results from the Human Genome Project). If we take off our scholarly hats for moment and ask ourselves whether someone with Down's syndrome processes information and behaves the same as the -average‖ person when evaluating political information or making everyday choices, we would know that this characterization is not accurate. Yet Down's syndrome results from just a relatively small genotypic and biological variation, a relatively small difference that can alter an entire set of social and physical behaviors (Antonarakis et al 2004) . Considering that we have endless small genetic differences across the entire population, the logical assumption would be that these differences also affect attitudes and behaviors in other things, including political preferences. Using biological models, we can test to see if small individual differences influence specific responses to external stimuli, or otherwise affect social conditions which in turn help influence or determine political choices and behaviors.
Early explorers were faced with the daunting problem of how we might go about examining these individual differences from an empirical position within the theoretical paradigm of evolutionary There have been many recent developments in the biological, physiological and genetic domains. One of the more promising areas to test models of political behavior has come from behavior genetics (Eaves Eysenck and Martin 1989; Eaves et al 1999; Eaves and Hatemi 2008; Hatemi et al 2007; Martin et al 1986; Poser et al 1996; Truett et al 1992) . Modern biometrical theory and methods focus on individual differences and provide a means to partition out environmental variance into that which is common to members of a family or social group (both social and genetic) and that which is unique to the individual, thus allowing political scientists a technique to examine different environmental and biological sources of preferences. The methods focus on both individual genetic variation as well as population norms (Neale and Cardon 1992) .
Using both family studies and genotypic data matched with behaviors, behavior genetic methods offer a means to test whether certain behaviors and attitudes are in fact heritable. Once genotypic data is collected, it becomes possible to link particular behaviors to specific genes which can be used as potential statistical predictors of behavior (e.g., Caspi 2002; Mattick 2004) . It has been widely accepted that a significant number of physical, physiological and behavioral traits ultimately result from a complex interaction between inheritance (genes) and the environment (Bailey et al. 1993; Eaves and Eysenck 1974; Eaves 1977; Happonen et al. 2002; Jansson et al. 2004; Jang and Livesley 1996; Neale et al. 1986; Olson et al. 2001; Saudino 1997; Truett et al. 1994 ).
The central problem EP and evolutionary designs faced in the past was the challenge of linking behavior to evolved traits, and while difficult to match current behavior with grandiose hypothesized selection pressures, behavior genetics can begin to show that certain behaviors and attitudes are passed on from our direct ancestors (heritable), thus providing powerful evidence that evolution in its simplest form (political traits passed on from our ancestors specifically) is empirically both feasible and falsifiable.
Behavior genetics offers a means to provide the empirical link between evolutionary theory and political behavior. Furthermore, these methods make it possible to confirm theories based on evolutionary survival traits. It could simply be that the genetic sources of certain political preferences are side effects of genes intended primarily for other purposes, such as immune system strength or longevity (Pfaff, Vasudevan, and Ko 2008) . Or we may come to find that genetic sources of political preferences are not a side product but rather designed to support preferences intended for group survival mechanisms, which in modern cultures are represented as political behaviors.
Initial studies utilizing twins and family members found that political traits are in fact genetically transmitted. That is, some underlying latent trait influenced by genes was indirectly influencing modern preference structures for certain political outcomes (Martin et al 1986; Eaves, Eysenck and Martin 1989; Alford, funk and Hibbing 205; Hatemi et al 2009a; Fowler Baker and Dawes 2008) . Additional research suggested that these genetic differences were moderated by sex (Hatemi, Medland and Eaves 2009 ). More advanced work looked at the importance of spousal selection in the genetic transmission of political preferences, noting that political preferences were among the strongest indicators of spousal similarity in a very wide variety of social and behavioral traits (Hatemi et al 2007) . Using molecular samples, Hatemi et al (2008b) reported that several genetic makers located within a chromosomal region which significantly predicted political preferences were related to olfactory and pheromone receptor activity.
These pheromone and olfactory receptors were similar to those discovered in animal studies of mate selection involving bacteria in mice. While it is far too early to state with any certainty, it is quite possible that the genetic sources of political preferences are simply intended for spousal selection and cohesion, in a similar manner to the way that mice mate selection is largely influenced by the immune system's exigencies (Kavaliers et al 2006) . In other words, mate selection, which clearly exerts a direct influence on reproductive fitness through sheer parental investment strategies, may operate at least partly on the basis of similarities in values and characteristics that manifest in the modern world as political preferences. The political tendencies affecting mate selection reflect not only proclivities toward parental investment, but may also help ensure sufficient genetic diversity in offspring as well as provide a basis for social cohesion within the context of cross-sex dyadic interaction which might otherwise be governed by conflicting sexual incentive structures.
In essence, genetics offers the beginning of an understanding of innate sources for political preferences by identifying latent factors that are transmitted genetically, by identifying specific genes that have a mean effect on a given trait, and by tying those genes to other human behavioral, hormonal, neurological, and physiological systems. Combined with environmental methods, the umbrella of evolution has the potential to better explain human political behaviors than extant models such as rational choice which appear leakier in their theoretical coverage of the empirical evidence. Along with genetics, an evolutionary model offers a way to help uncover and explain individual difference within the context of human universals.
Conclusions
E.O. Wilson (2002) stated that, -[t] he boundary between the natural sciences on one side and humanities and humanistic social sciences on the other is not an epistemological fault line, but a broad domain of poorly understood material phenomena that invites cooperative exploration from both sides.‖
The use of evolutionary theory has been previously introduced into the political psychology literature but with limited success (e.g., Sidanius and Kurzban 2003) . Instead, the use of evolutionary models tends to evoke strong negative reactions. -In effect, social scientists treat the life sciences as enclosed within impermeable walls. Inside these walls, evolutionary thinking is deemed capable of producing powerful and astonishing truths; outside them, in the realm of human behavior, applications of evolutionary thinking are typically treated as irrelevant and often as pernicious, wrong, or downright dangerous.‖ (Lustick 2005) However, the last several years have witnessed increasing acceptance of evolutionary models in a variety of domains, as evidenced by its emergence within the flagship journals in political science, funding from political science arms of the National Science Foundation (see Medland and Hatemi 2009) , and panels devoted to the topic in the discipline's main conferences. The introduction of the theory of evolution to build a model of human political behavior is one which attempts to explain human behavior by considering how evolution acts through genes, but also how it exerts an influence on the relationship between genes and the environment in reciprocal fashion. More contemporary research has moved far away from the nature/nurture debate which has driven animosity toward evolution. Rather, if anything, it is clear that environment is as much a part of the process of evolution as the inheritance of genes. In so far as political attitudes are concerned, it is culture that is driving genetic transmission, as spouses tend to sort on political preferences above almost all other traits, and then pass down those genes that have some influence in social behavior in greater amounts than under random mating (e.g., Eaves and Hatemi 2008) .
The most important attitude for political scientists to take toward the influence of endogenous factors on political attitudes and behavior is not to accept biological or evolutionary findings blindly, but to treat the entire paradigm as testable. Certainly, proclivities toward certain behaviors are inherited to varying degrees, and likely so are many preferences, but not all individual differences in behaviors or preferences may be subject to evolutionary pressures or genetic influence. For example, it appears that for the specific nature of group affiliation, whether religious or political party, genes appear to have no significant influence on individual difference, and parental socialization is almost all that matters (Hatemi et al 2009a) . Thus, the goal is not to find the -genes‖ for a certain behavior, but rather to identify both environmental and innate determinants of behavior and to ascertain how they interact, if at all, and to achieve a clearer and better defined set of biological and environmental mechanisms to explore the extent to which they are relevant to specific modern political behaviors.
Biology may give us the beginning of understanding why we want what we want, and delineating the internal processes and preferences we have, while our lives, upbringing, society and personal experience alter those things to varying degrees. How we go about making decisions, although not uninfluenced by our biology, is a matter of personal will, but the preferences for those choices, and the processes by which we go about making such choices, are mediated by our internal and external conditions. Behavior is not predetermined, but influenced by many factors from both within and outside the body. Emil Durkheim (1895) claimed the study of social behaviors was a distinct and independent discipline; social behaviors could only be explained by social indicators. While this view remains dominant among the majority of political scientists, the effective identification and inclusion of biology as a source of human behavior has largely debunked such claims.
Evolution accepts the importance of the environment as encompassing heritable adaptations that exist, and are activated, in reaction to specific environmental contingencies. Thus, in the face of similar genetic traits, humans often have different preferences and behaviors in response to divergent cues and triggers. As a populace, we possess certain similar inherent characteristics; as individuals, we share certain genetic traits. The question for political scientists is whether the combination of these factors within the context of the modern environment translates into identifiable predictors of political attitudes, behaviors and preferences? To examine the individual variation within our species using biological paradigms we need to find genetic similarities which correlate with observed or self identified preferences. Without biological methodologies, our options for behavioral research remain limited to studying the social processes and institutions which have preoccupied the discipline for decades This work, while undoubtedly useful, enlightening and often accurate, nonetheless represents only part of the story of human development and expression. However, by incorporating biological models and methods, political behavior research has the opportunity to examine the biological, physical and environmental sources of political preferences and behaviors, for both a given population and at an individual level.
A theory is only as useful as the empirical tools available to test it. By presenting a theoretical framework that allows for empirical testing, one that ties together a group of literature and models, and remains open to change and modification when new results provide evidence that deem it necessary, evolutionary theory offers the beginnings of a more complete and fruitful theoretical underpinning for the empirical exploration of political behavior.
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